When self-perceptions of expertise increase closed-minded cognition: The earned dogmatism effect☆
Section snippets
Earned dogmatism and the flexible merit standard model
The Earned Dogmatism Hypothesis is derived on the basis of the Flexible Merit Standard Model (Ottati et al., 2015). The Flexible Merit Standard Model presumes that, when thinking about an issue, individuals initially activate and select an appropriate “merit standard.” That is, individuals consider the degree to which a dogmatic versus open-minded reaction is appropriate and merited. A cognitive orientation may be viewed as appropriate in one situation, but inappropriate in another situation (
Alternative hypotheses
Success may elicit a variety of feelings (power, security, anxiety, self-esteem) and cognitive states (attitude certainty, attitude extremity). Research suggests that, in many cases, these states elicit an effect that is opposite of the Earned Dogmatism Effect. Specifically, research indicates success elicits positive states (high self-esteem, self-assurance, happiness) whereas failure elicits negative states (e.g., irritability, sadness, anxiety; Heatherton and Polivy, 1991, Nummenmaa and
Experiment 1
According to the Earned Dogmatism Hypothesis, social norms dictate that closed-mindedness is more warranted or justifiable when exhibited by an “expert” than a “novice.” Experiment 1 presented participants with a description of “Jason.” Jason's previously acquired political knowledge was described as extremely extensive (expert) or extremely limited (novice). In both conditions, Jason's present political thinking was described as closed-minded and dogmatic. It was predicted that Jason's present
Experiment 2
The remaining experiments test the core prediction associated with the Earned Dogmatism Hypothesis, namely that self-perceived expertise engenders a more closed-minded style of thinking. Experiments 2–4 manipulated self-perceived expertise by having participants succeed (high self-perceived expertise) or fail (low self-perceived expertise) at a task. In Experiment 2, participants completed an easy or difficult political knowledge test, and were provided with false feedback that implied their
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 employed a variant of Schwarz et al.’s (1991) “ease of retrieval” manipulation. Participants were asked to name either two (easy) or ten (difficult) policies implemented by President Obama. It was presumed that participants in the two-policy condition would infer from their relative ease of retrieval that they knew a respectable amount about politics, leading to high self-perceptions of political expertise. Participants in the ten-policy condition were expected to infer from the
Experiment 4
Experiment 4 manipulated success versus failure by administering an easy or extremely difficult test. Participants were shown the correct answer after completing each item, and therefore knew they answered many correctly in the success condition or few correctly in the failure condition. The questions were in multiple domains (e.g., music, history). Performance on this general knowledge test was predicted to influence General Open-Minded Cognition. It was predicted that General Open-Minded
Experiment 5
According to role theory, an individual (e.g., college senior) can occupy a “high expertise role” in some situations (e.g., providing academic advice to college freshman) and a “low expertise role” in other situations (e.g., obtaining academic advice from a faculty member). Thus, in everyday life, perceptions of relative expertise vary within the individual across situations. The final two experiments focus on this “within-individual” variation by examining participants' responses to three
Experiment 6
Experiment 6 focused exclusively on the Earned Dogmatism Hypothesis. Participants were exposed to the “high expertise role” scenario and “control” scenario. Again, participants read each of these scenarios twice, first imagining that “John” is the protagonist and then imagining that they themselves (“You”) are the protagonist. After reading the “John” version, participants provided Normative Entitlement ratings. After reading the “You” version, participants provided their Situation Specific
General discussion & conclusion
Research regarding the Flexible Merit Standard Model demonstrates that different situations activate different normative standards that produce different levels of open-minded cognition (Ottati et al., 2015). Extending this logic, the Earned Dogmatism Hypothesis presumes that normative expectations also differ for individuals who occupy distinct roles within the same situation (Katz and Kahn, 1978, Triandis, 1972, Triandis et al., 1984). Specifically, it was proposed that role expectations
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This research was made possible through the support of a grant from the Fuller Theological Seminary/Thrive Center in concert with the John Templeton Foundation (IH-111). Opinions are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Fuller Thrive Center or the John Templeton Foundation.